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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
UNDER THE INCOME-TAX LAWS 
FLOYD E. GILLIS AND VERNON L. SMITH 
Purdue University 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IN TIlS note classical tools are used to ex- 
amine the treatment of "gifts in kind" un- 
der the federal income-tax laws as they were 
but a few years ago, as they are today, and as 
they should be, given the objective that the 
law appears to be trying to achieve. It will 
be demonstrated that, under certain condi- 
tions, firms today can maximize profit after 
taxes by producing some output to be given 
to acceptable charities. 
II. THE LAW 
Just as cash gifts to approved charities 
and educational institutions are deductible 
from gross income in the determination of 
taxable income, so are gifts made in kind.1 
When such gifts in kind are made, they are 
deductible at "fair market value," a term 
which could have a variety of meanings. In 
this paper it will mean the price at which 
the firm or individual could sell the gift in 
its most conservative market. This con- 
struction can be and has been put on the 
meaning of the term,2 and, since it is the 
most favorable to the taxpayer, it is pre- 
sumably the pertinent one. If the property 
is a capital good, rather than an inventory 
item, or if the return is that of an individual 
rather than a firm, the gift item is still de- 
ductible at fair market value regardless of 
1 The basic law discussed in this paper is found in 
secs. 23(o) and 23(q) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
We have relied heavily upon the Prentice-Hlall Tax 
Service, 1944 through 1956. Gifts of services are not 
deductible. 
2 See the Old Mission Valley Portland Cement 
Co. case as reported in the Prentice-Hall Tax Serv- 
ice, Sec. 12,827, and Revenue Ruling 55-138. De- 
tailed analysis of all possible meanings of the term is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
its tax base, and gains or losses are not re- 
portable.3 
Recognizing that an item given away 
rather than sold affects the taxpayer's 
revenue, the law has always attempted to 
provide some incentive for donations to ap- 
proved organizations by allowing the dona- 
tion to be deducted in an amount equal to 
the foregone revenue. The law, however, has 
not always appeared to recognize, or at 
least to appreciate, the fact that the item is 
already deductible at cost by virtue of hav- 
ing been produced. Indeed, it is not until 
1948 that one finds specific recognition of 
the fact that gifts affect costs as well as 
taxable revenues. Prior to 1948, presum- 
ably, the shrewd firm deducted the fair 
market value from computed net profits in 
the determination of taxable income and de- 
ducted total costs (not excluding the costs 
of the articles given away) from gross 
revenues in the determination of net profits. 
There was no ruling to prohibit the deduc- 
tion of the gift twice: once as a contribution, 
once as an ordinary cost of production! 
There are two possible interpretations of 
this absence of law. Charitably, one might 
argue that perhaps no taxpayer had been 
bold enough to claim the double deduction, 
and therefore no ruling or case was neces- 
3 Federal Tax Service, 1948 (New York: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1948), II, 12, 710. 
4This ruling (see Prentice-Hall Tax Service, 
1948), based on the Supreme Court case, Helvering v. 
Paul R. G. Horst (311 U.S. 112), held that "expenses 
of production are deductible . . . as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses." Here the taxpayer 
was required to include the fair market value of the 
product in gross revenue and deduct it again in the 
computation of taxable income. This is a more severe 
treatment than that of the Old Mission Valley Port- 
land Cement Co. case analyzed below. 
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sary. Another construction is that, in the 
routine of auditing returns and verifying 
whether or not the gift was to a bona fide 
recipient, no notice was taken of the cost 
figures at all. 
Our first task, then, will be to analyze, in 
Section ITI, rational behavior of the firm 
where a double deduction is allowed for 
product donations. 
Two rules govern the current treatment 
of such donations. In Revenue Ruling 55- 
1385 one finds the following: 
The fair market value of agricultural or 
manufactured products or property held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business which is 
contributed . . . is not includable in the gross 
income of the donor for Federal Income Tax 
purposes.... The fair market value which 
may be deducted from gross income . . . will be 
the replacement cost to the donor in his most 
favorable market. There must be an adjustment 
to inventory effecting the removal of the do- 
nated article and the costs pertaining thereto 
... in order to avoid a double deduction.6 
Here the fair market value is defined as "the 
replacement cost to the donor in his most 
favorable market." A more specific descrip- 
tion of the treatment of deductions for gifts 
in kind is found in the Old Mission Valley 
Portland Cement Company case.7 In this 
case the taxpayer included the fair market 
value of the gift (which seems to have been 
its regular selling price) as a part of gross 
revenue, deducted it in the determination 
of taxable income, and included its costs of 
production in its ordinary expenses. The 
courts ruled that the taxpayer could also 
deduct the gross profit arising from inclusion 
of the gift in revenues, gross profits being 
the difference between actual cost and fair 
market value. the inclusion in revenues is 
canceled by the deduction from profits, 
thereby washing out, and the true deduction 
is cost plus gross profits, or selling price. 
Our second task, in Section IV, will be an 
analysis of rational behavior when the firm 
5 Internal Revenue Bulletin 1955-11. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Prentice-Hall Tax Service, 1954, Sec. 12,827. 
must exclude costs involved in a donation 
but can deduct it at selling price. Since it 
can be shown that even the present modified 
law yields an actual profit on product dona- 
tions under certain conditions, and in such 
instances it is far preferable to give away 
goods than to giv e away money, certain 
questions arise about what the law should 
be. 
Our final task, then, will be an analysis 
of what the law should be if its intent is to 
treat gifts in kind in the same way as cash 
gifts. 
III. OPTIMAL PRODUCT DONATIONS BY 
FIRMS UNDER DOUBLE 
DEDUCTIBILITY 
The analysis of this section applies to the 
case in which a firm deducts from its profits 
before taxes both the market value of units 
of product donated to qualified charitable 
institutions and the costs of producing them. 
The argument, therefore, has had no prac- 
tical application since the Internal Revenue 
Department felt obliged in its 1955 ruling to 
disallow any (Iouble-deductibility interpre- 
tation of the original Internal Revenue 
Code of 1939. 
a) TITE THEORY OF TiHE FIRM UNDER 
TH-E TAX LAW 
Wre direct our attention first to the non- 
incorporated firm operating unrler pure 
competition and taxed under the individual 
income tax law. Let z be the total production 
of the frm, x be the quantity of product that 
the firm sells on the open market, and y be 
the quantity of product donated to some 
qualified charitable organization (that is, 
= x + y). Suppose the firm sells its 
product for a price p and produces at a 
short-run total cost given by the function 
C(S), where the latter is convex from below 
beyond some level of production. Let the 
tax function faced by the firm be i[0], where 
0 is the firm's taxable income; that is, gross 
income minus all deductio-ns and exemp- 
tions. Under the provisions of the tax law, 
if K is the total dollar amount of all the 
firm's exemptions and deductions that are 
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constant (independent of production and 
donations), and if the donation, y, is de- 




In equation (1) px is the firm's gross 
receipts, while px - C(z) is the firm's 
"profit (or loss) from business" as it is 
termed on Form 1040 of the Individual In- 
come Tax Return. The latter sum would 
also be "adjusted gross income" if the pro- 
prietor earned no wages or income from 
other sources such as dividends and inter- 
est. The quantity Py would be the firm's de- 
ductions because of donations in the form of 
product. Note in equation (1) that, for 
every unit given away rather than sold, tax- 
able income decreases by 2p dollars. 
In line with the postulates of pure compe- 
tition, it will be assumed that the quantity 
y which is given away has no effect on the 
market price of the product or on the 
amount the firm can sell at that price. 
Profits, net of income taxes, can therefore 




Under the present progressive income tax 
T[6] is convex from below, and 
/dT T= d 6 < 1 . 
The necessary conditions for the maxi- 
mization of profits in (2) are 
a = P -a(z) T' .p aC ( z) 0 
ay=-t-T' ay 
where aC(z)1az is simply marginal cost, 
AIC(z). Hence the conditions for profit 
maximization under the income-tax law are, 
first, adjust total ouput to a level x= 
such that 
p=MC(z0), (3) 
the usual conditions for an optimum; and, 
second, adjust the quantity of output given 
away to a level y= y, such that 
T' [pz-C(zO) -2py0-K] -a . (4) 
The latter condition asserts that, given zo as 
determined from (3), units are given away 
until the marginal tax rate falls to 2, or until 
the firm is operating in the 50 per cent in- 
come-tax bracket. This condition may be 
derived verbally as follows: For each unit 
that is given away rather than sold, the loss 
due to failure to sell is -p. On the other 
hand, the gain is given by the marginal tax 
rate multiplied by the amount by which 
taxable income declines. But taxable income 
declines p due to the loss in sales and an- 
other p because the value of the unit is de- 
ductible when donated. Hence the total 
gain from donating a unit rather than 
selling it is -p + T' {2p}, and units will 
be given away until this marginal gain is 
zero; that is, -p + T' {2p} = 0 or 
T' = 1 
-2. 
There are two boundary conditions on 
the solution in addition to these marginal 
conditions. The first stems from the fact 
that, if the firm is operating in an income- 
tax bracket less than or equal to 50 per cent, 
the firm cannot improve its position by giv- 
ing away part of its output. The second 
boundary condition grows out of a further 
provision of the income-tax law, namely, 
that, "in general, the deduction for con- 
tributions may not exceed 20 percent of 
your adjusted gross income.... However, 
you may increase this limitation to 30 per- 
cent if the extra 10 percent consists of con- 
tributions made to churches, a convention 
or association of churches, tax-exempt edu- 
cational institutions, tax-exempt hospitals, 
or certain medical research organizations."' 
This provision places an upper bound, y, on 
8 Federal Tax Regulations, 1957, U-8, Code (St. 
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1958), p. 5. 
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the quantity of output that can be given 
away. Hence 
? < yO? < 
where 
yp=0.30 [pz0-p -C(z0)] (5) 
or 
0.1-3)[?-C (p Z)] 
From this analysis we can conclude that, 
under the double-deductibility interpreta- 
tion of the income-tax law, if a firm pro- 
duced a form of property which it was 
feasible to donate to charitable institutions, 
then profit maximization required the pro- 
prietor of that firm to adjust sales to a level 
that would just place him in the 50 per cent 
income-tax bracket. The one exception to 
this would arise where the firm's donations 
in the form of product were as much as 30 
per cent of "adjusted gross income." 
5) THE CASE OF INDEPEN.DENCE BETWEEN 
SALES AND DONATIONS 
Dynamic considerations, uncertainty, ig- 
norance of the complete cost function, or the 
failure to use marginal principles in price- 
output determination may render the pre- 
ceding approach impractical for decision- 
making. For example, the firm may have a 
fixed-price policy because of fear of retalia- 
tion, "spoiling the market," or other con- 
siderations and may proceed to sell all that 
the market will absorb at that price. Under 
these conditions, can the firm improve its 
position by producing output purely for 
donation purposes and deducting the value 
of such donations from its taxable income? 
The answer is "Yes." 
To simplify the analysis, we shall assume 
that the donation is to a non-competing 
market such as a charity which is not itself a 
customer of the firm in question or one that 
will distribute the donation exclusively to 
markets in which the firm cannot compete. 
An example of this latter case would arise if 
a shoe manufacturer who could not seriously 
consider selling shoes in Belgium gave shoes 
to CARE; this organization could give 
away an almost indefinite number of shoes 
to the Belgians.9 
Suppose our firm finds that it can sell x 
units at the established price p. Using the 
same notation as before, the problem is to 
maximize 
(6) 
-T paX-C(X-d-y) -py-K] 
with respect to y. Setting or ay = 0 gives 
y0, such that 
T'I[ Px-C (x -+ y0) -py0-KI 
MC(x+y0) (7) 
MC(x+yo) +P 
This condition states that units should be 
given away until the marginal tax rate falls 
to the ratio of marginal cost to marginal 
cost plus price. The condition can be de- 
rived verbally as follows: For each addi- 
tional unit produced for donation, the cost 
incurred is MIC. The marginal return on a 
unit given away is the marginal tax rate 
multiplied by the decrease in taxable in- 
come. But taxable income declines MC dol- 
lars because of the deductibility of the cost 
of producing the item, and p dollars because 
of the deductibility of the item at its market 
value. Therefore the marginal net return on 
a unit produced for donation is T { MC + 
p } - AIC, and units will be given away un- 
til this marginal gain is zero; that is, 
1" * MIC + p }- C = 0 or T' =Mc + P. 




and, in equilibrium, the marginal tax rate is 
less than 2. Consequently, a firm whose 
price was greater than its marginal cost 
could benefit from donations even if it fell in 
an incomne-tax bracket of less than 2- 
I One of the advantages offered by CARE as a 
dumping market is the fact that this organization 
allows the donor to specify the country to which the 
gift is to be sent. 
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If the firm's best estimate of total cost is 
a linear estimate similar to those used in 
break-even chart analysis, then marginal 
cost is constant; and, if we express marginal 
cost as a proportion of price, say Ml1C = 3p, 
then the condition (7) becomes 
T' [px - C (x) - p (1 + ) y - K] 
- 
: Hi or T'[0- (1?f3)py'] (8) 
The expression 0 = -C(s)-K would 
be the firm's taxable income if it produced 
no output for donation purposes. 
C) EXTENSION TO THE CORPORATION 
The analysis of optimal product donation 
policy for the corporation is especially 
simple in view of the flat 52 per cent tax on 
corporation earnings over $25,000. In this 
case the tax function is simply T[0] = 16 = 
0.520. In the general case of a non-linear 
cost function C(I + y), and, where sales 
and donations are independent, equation (6) 
for the corporation becomes 
r= Px-C(+?y) 
-t {p5x-C(.+y) -PY 
in which we have set K equal to 0, since the 
exemption provisions of the individual in- 
come-tax law do not apply to the corpora- 
tion. Maximizing (9) with respect to y gives 
the condition, 
ip 0.5 2 Mc Ox+ Y) = 1 t 0I4-8 P (0 (10) 
= 1.083p. 
Therefore product donations should be ad- 
justed until marginal cost equals 1.083p. 
Just as in the analysis of the non-incor- 
porated firm, there are two boundary condi- 
tions on the solution. The lower bound is de- 
termined by the condition that the 52 per 
cent tax rate applies only to corporations 
earning a net income in excess of $25,000. 
The second (upper) boundary condition is 
fixed by the requirement that the corpora- 
tion cannot donate more than 5 per cent of 
its taxable income. 
If marginal cost is constant, as in break- 
even chart analysis, then we can write 
l11C= jp, and for this case we have a 
'corner") solution in which, if it pays to give 
away at all, it pays to give away the maxi- 
mum amount allowable under the law. In- 
deed, if the parameter : < 1.083, it pays to 
give away up to the full 5 per cent upper 
bound, that is, until 
py = 0.05* px-C (x) - Spy} 
= 0.05* { - opp} 
or 
Py = 0.05, (11) 
Pl?0.03-f3. 
IV. OPTIMAL PRODUCT DONATIONTS BY 
FIRMS UNDER DEDUCTIBILITY AT 
MARIKT VALUE ONLY 
Since the 1955 ruling, in which the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue clearly recog- 
nized that the tax law did not prohibit 
double deduction of donations in kind, the 
application of the law has allowed the firm 
to deduct such donations at market value 
only. XWhat has not been recognized is that, 
under this interpretation, both the corpo- 
rate and the non-corporate enterprise, under 
conditions likely to prevail in practice, can 
still increase profits after taxes by making 
product donations. The new ruling reduces 
the magnitude of the profits to be so gained 
but still does not place product donations 
on a par with cash donations, which clearly 
do not yield the donor a net gain. The reason 
for this is simply that, under the present 
law, a separate give-away market is created 
for firms with excess capacity, and, under 
conditions which are still fairly weak, it pays 
to produce for "sale" in this market. 
a) THE THEORY OF THE FIRM UNDER 
THE 1955 RULING 
The first important area in which the new 
ruling delimits the range of application of 
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the law is for the firm in pure competition. 
Under pure competition no gains can accrue 
to the firm, regardless of its income-tax 
bracket, from product donations deductible 
at market price, since, by hypothesis, the 
firm can sell unlimited quantities at the 
going market price. 
This can be seen mathematically by 
observing that equation (1) now becomes 
0=px-C(x) -py-K, (1') 
in which the costs of producing y cannot be 
deducted from gross income in arriving at 
taxable income. Equation (2) then becomes 
wPr z-py -C(z) 
(2') 
-T [p z-C ( z-y) -2py-K] . 
Maximizing, we get the same conditions in 
(3); that is, MC(z0) = p, but condition (4) 
becomes T' = 1, and there exists no positive 
solution for y0. 
b) INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN 
SALES AND DONATIONS 
Under the new ruling, equation (6) be- 
comes 
r=Pi--C(X+y) (6') 
- T [p.~- C (x) - y K] . 
Now setting Erh/ay = 0 gives y0, such that 
T' [px - C (x) - py?- K] 
MCG(+y0) (7') 
_p 
According to this condition, if p > ARC, 
then T' < 1. Therefore, a positive solution 
for yo requires price to be greater than 
marginal cost. Condition (7') is clearly 
stronger than (7). 
If marginal cost is constant, and we set 
MC = Op, then the condition (7') becomes 
T,'[I-py] I=[ (8"s 
where 0 = p- C() - K would be the 
firm's taxable income exclusive of deduc- 
tions for product donations. Using equation 
(8') and the income-tax tables, it is possible 
to map the relationship between 0 and the 
optimal dollar value of output donations, 
pyo, for various values of 3.10 To construct 
such a map for any given A, we simply set 
0 - pyo equal to the income level cor- 
responding to a tax bracket of 13 and solve 
for py/. If 0*(A) is the income level at which 
the tax bracket is 1003 per cent, then 
pyO= Q0* (/) (8a) 
gives optimal product value donations as a 
function of taxable income 0. Of course, py0 
is zero if 0 < 0*(O). The upper bound on 
yO is y, such that Py = 0.30{0 + K - py} 
or 
py = 0?+K (8'b) 
py3.33?13. 
A decision map for optimal donations 
under the 1955 ruling is shown in Figure 1, 
the computation for which was carried out 
by applying equations (8'a) and (8'b) to an 
unmarried taxpayer with K = $600. As an 
illustration of the use of this diagram, con- 
sider a firm whose marginal cost is constant 
at 65 per cent of its selling price. We see that 
for A = 0.65 such a firm would have to earn 
a taxable income of $32,000 before product 
donations could be made without incurring 
a net loss in income after taxes. For taxable 
income in excess of $32,000, the 1 = 0.65 
contour allows one to read off the value of 
product donations that will maximize in- 
come after taxes. At a taxable income of 
about $43,500 a "kink" occurs in the con- 
tour, since for incomes above this value the 
30 per cent limit on donations determines 
the optimal product donation. 
Suppose, under these conditions, that a 
10 Computing 0 would cause no difficulties beyond 
those normally encountered in filing income-tax re- 
turns. The parameter if = MC/p is also completely 
operational in that it requires nothing more sophis- 
ticated than a break-even chart for the firm's op- 
erations. 
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firm has a reportable income of $40,000 
and gives nothing away. From the income 
tax table for an unmarried taxpayer its tax 
is as follows: 
Tax on the first $32,000 ............ $14,460 
Tax of 65 per cent on the next $6,000 3,900 
Tax of 69 per cent on the next $2,000 1,380 














20 40 60 80 1 010 1 2 I 140 160 
TAXABLE INCOME, (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS) 
FIG. 1.-A decision map for optimal product donations by firms under the income tax 
and profit after taxes is $20,260. To demon- 
strate that the firm betters itself, assume 
optimal donations with a fair market value 
of $8,000 (see Fig. 1) at a cost (I3 = 0.65) of 
$5,200." 
11 The reader will note that the same net profit is 
obtained by gifts of $2,000 or any amount between 
$2,000 and $8,000. This zone of indifference occurs 
whenever f3 equals the marginal tax rate, because of 
the discontinuities in the income-tax function. Fig- 
ure 1 has been constructed for values of j3 coinciding 
with actual tax-bracket percentages and assumes 
that the firm gives away output until the lower 
bound of the relevant tax bracket is reached. 
Taxable profits .................... $40,000 
Cost of contribution ...... . $ 5, 200 
Tax on $32,000 reportable in- 
come ................... $14,460 
Total, tax plus contribution ..... 19,660 
Profit after taxes .............. $20,340 
The firm has bettered itself-ignoring good 
will-by $80 through a product donation 
valued at $8,000. 
The analysis of Section IV on the corpo- 
ration applies, with minor alterations, to the 
corporate case under the 1955 ruling. For 
example, under deductibility at market 
value only, equation (10) becomes MC= 
0.52p. 
V. CAN CASH AND PRODUCT DONATIONS 
BE GIVEN EQUAL TREATMENT? 
Clearly, allowing deductions for cash 
gifts made to acceptable organizations is a 
direct inducement extended to taxpayers to 
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encourage such gifts. In effect, the govern- 
ment pays a portion of the cost of such gifts, 
a percentage equal to the tax rate; one 
would suspect that the intention in extend- 
ing such inducements to donations other 
than cash is to subsidize them to the same 
extent. There seems to be little reason why 
Congress would view product donations as 
either more or less socially desirable than 
cash gifts. This raises the question: Just how 
should the tax law be stated if product 
donations are to be put on a par with cash 
gifts? 
As it turns out, under both the individual 
and the corporate income tax, there is a 
simple general ruling that will make all 
firms indifferent between product donations 
and cash donations. Such a ruling is simply 
to allow the firm to compute taxable income 
by deducting from gross receipts the total 
cost of producing both the units sold and 
any units that are donated. Under such a 
ruling, profit would be given by 
r= pX-C(?+y) (12) 
- T [px~- Cx+ y) ] 
and the firm could not make product dona- 
tions without reducing profit after taxes. 
Indeed, it would make no difference to the 
firm whether it donated $1,000 cash or units 
of product that cost $1,000 to produce. 
It is difficult to understand why this rul- 
ing was not handed down at the very 
beginning. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
WVe suggest that the preceding analysis 
has far-reaching implications. Even in the 
absence of a double deduction, there must be 
many corporations with excess capacity that 
will not lower prices to increase sales because 
of the nature of their demand curve or be- 
cause of some fear of spoiling the market 
and whose marginal costs are less than 52 
per cent of their selling price. Rationally, 
they should find some acceptable institu- 
tion (not constituting part of their usual 
market) and give more in order to make 
more. The conditions are even more favor- 
able for the unincorporated entrepreneur 
who is in a higher marginal tax bracket than 
the corporation. One can imagine a firm 
changing its fiscal year so that the last 
month will be the slackest, estimating reve- 
nues and taxes in order to decide rationally 
how much activity yields them the largest 
net profit, and budgeting product donations 
along with sales. 
Since neither of us pretends to be a stu- 
dent of tax rulings, it is suggested that 
many more-perhaps more important-pro- 
visions of the law might be fruitfully ex- 
posed to similar analysis. One is the de- 
ductibility of disasters: What is the true 
cost of insurance for a man in the 80 per 
cent tax bracket when, if his house burns 
down, he can deduct 100 per cent of the 
uninsured loss?"2 His premiums yield a 
marginal protection of only 20 per cent of 
the value of the house. 
12 This problem could be analyzed by application 
of the apparatus discussed in Milton Friedman and 
L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices In- 
volving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 
LVI, No. 4 (August, 1948). It is interesting that the 
authors of this article called attention to the impor- 
tance of the deductibility of uninsured losses (see n. 
16, p. 285, and n. 32, p. 295) in applying utility the- 
ory to insurance choice. 
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